MaskWright

2026-05-28 · Jordan Hale · 659 words

Audit trails you cannot have without a server

Audit trails need a server. We do not have one for profiles. This honesty page is what a local tool cannot claim, so a buyer does not expect a SIEM.

Audit trails you cannot have without a server 1

Audit trails need a server. We do not have one for profiles. A buyer who wants a SIEM of who launched which profile will not find it here. This honesty page exists so that expectation dies before procurement.

The note sits in Privacy because “we do not log you” and “we cannot prove who clicked” are the same architecture.

What a real trail requires

A user id. Clocks you trust. An append-only log off the workstation. Integrity so the operator cannot edit the history. That is a control plane. It is also a diary of your work. No team seats means we never built the roster that log would attach to.

Windows Event Logs, your EDR, your proxy provider’s dashboard: those are trails that exist without us. They are not “MaskWright launched uuid X at 14:02.”

What we have instead

A local store. Disk use is files on disk. mtime on folders if you go looking. Backups you make. Cookie export and localStorage import as operator actions we do not phone home. What leaves this machine: updater and ads, not a launch ledger.

Contractors should be visible in Facebook’s user list, not in a MaskWright admin. Do not email the folder: we cannot tell you if they did.

profiles.json encryption does not produce an audit stream. It produces a sealed index at rest.

WantedIn 0.1
Who launched profile XNot recorded by us
Who exported cookiesNot recorded by us
Vendor access logNo vendor access to profiles
Platform user logOn the platform

If a SOC2 questionnaire asks whether we log administrator access to customer sessions, the accurate answer is that we do not host customer sessions. There is no administrator. There is a Windows user. Your EDR can watch that user. Facebook can tell you which BM user spent. We cannot tell you which uuid launched at 14:02 last Tuesday unless you kept your own notes.

I keep a boring ops note when it matters: who sat at the PC, which profile name, which job. That note is yours. It is not a product feature. It is also not evidence we signed.

Do not buy MaskWright expecting a paper trail for a fight with a contractor. Buy platform roles and a contract. The local folder will not testify.

Pushback I hear: “we need this for SOC2.” Then you need a hosted control plane, not this app. We will not fake a launch ledger. Use platform admin logs and your EDR. A local folder will not testify in a fight with a contractor. That is the honesty page. Procurement should read it before they buy.

FAQ

Can I grep logs on the PC?

You can look at OS artifacts. We do not ship a product audit UI. Treat it as best-effort forensics, not compliance evidence.

Will enterprises require this?

Some will. Those buyers should buy a cloud product with a DPA and a log. Do not force a local app to lie.

Is “no audit trail” a privacy feature?

It is a consequence. Privacy-minded people like it. Security teams hate it. Both are reacting to the same missing server. Download MaskWright if you wanted the missing server.

Can I tail a log file MaskWright writes?

We do not ship a product launch ledger. OS artifacts are your forensics, not our evidence. Do not expect a SIEM row with a uuid and a timestamp signed by us.

Facebook can tell you which BM user spent. Your EDR can watch the Windows user. We cannot tell you which uuid launched at 14:02 last Tuesday unless you kept your own notes. Those notes are yours, not a product feature.

A local folder will not testify. Buy platform roles and a contract if the fight is with a contractor.

If procurement asked for a SIEM of antidetect launches, answer with the platform’s admin logs and your EDR. Do not answer with us. We cannot honestly offer that row.

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